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strain from inflicting bodily injury upon the attacker.3 5 It is sub-
mitted that this fine line between deadly and non-deadly threaten-
ing conduct needs to be more clearly defined in order to better
effectuate the purpose of the law of self-defense.
Mary Flynn
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
A common carrier, whether municipally or privately owned, may
be liable for the failure of its employees to summon aid upon wit-
nessing the attack of a passenger
Although municipal corporations have traditionally enjoyed
governmental immunity from liability in tort,' all states have con-
sented to waive this immunity to some extent.2 New York distin-
See id. at 29, 496 N.E.2d at 860, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (5th ed. 1984):
The traditional rule was that municipalities held a governmental immunity in
tort, but one different both in origin and scope from the 'sovereign' or governmen-
tal immunity of the state. Since municipalities exhibited a corporate or proprie-
tary face .... the traditional immunity was narrower than the full range of mu-
nicipal activities, protecting only the governmental activities and not the
proprietary ones.
Id. The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in England and is based on the concept
that "the King can do no wrong." Id. at 1032-33. "[Sovereign immunity] was accepted by
American judges in the early days of the republic, and ever since the law of the United
States has been that, except to the extent the government consents to suit, it is immune."
Id. Municipal tort immunity has its roots in the sovereign immunity doctrine. See Note,
Municipal Tort Liability For Criminal Attacks Against Passengers on Mass Transporta-
tion, 12 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 325, 326 (1984) [hereinafter Municipal Tort]; Note, Municipal
Torts: The Rule Is Liability-The Exception Is Immunity-Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v.
Eriksson Engineering Ltd., 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 327, 328 (1984) [hereinafter Note].
2 Municipal Tort, supra note 1, at 326. New York State's waiver of sovereign immunity
was effected through the Court of Claims Act. N.Y. Judiciary Court of Claims Act Law § 8
(McKinney 1963). Other states have similarly waived immunity for tort liability. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-4707-08 (1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8104 (1980); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.996(107) (Callaghan 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-29-83 (1972). One reason for the
waiver of sovereign immunity is the "availability and use of insurance or other modern
funding methods [which] render an argument based on economics invalid." Enghauser Mfg.
Co. v. Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 34, 451 N.E.2d 228, 231 (1983).
New York's Court of Claims Act provides, in part, that "the state hereby waives its
immunity from liability.., and consents to have the same determined in accordance with
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guishes between a municipal corporation's governmental and pro-
prietary capacities,3 and maintains the rule that liability cannot be
imposed for torts which result from characteristically governmen-
tal acts.4 The municipal corporation may be liable, however, for
the same rules of law as applied... against individuals or corporations ..... N.Y. Judiciary
Court of Claims Act Law § 8 (McKinney 1963). This waiver also applies to municipalities.
See Becker v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 226, 235-36, 140 N.E.2d 262, 268, 159 N.Y.S.2d
174, 183 (1957) (municipality liable for negligent medical act of registered nurse); Bernar-
dine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945) (state's waiver of
sovereign immunity extends to civil divisions of the state). However, New York's waiver of
immunity is not a total one. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586-87, 167 N.E.2d 63, 66, 200
N.Y.S.2d 409, 414 (1960) (Court of Claims Act does not place state on parity with private
corporation in respect to all defenses). The court stated in Urquhart v. City of Ogdensburg,
91 N.Y. 67 (1883), that:
The rule is well settled that where power is conferred on... a municipal corpora-
tion to make improvements, such as streets, sewers, etc., and keep them in repair,
the duty to make them is quasi judicial or discretionary ... and for a failure to
exercise this power or an erroneous estimate of the public needs, no civil action
can be maintained.
Id. at 71.
3 See Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 410-411, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573-74
(2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973). The courts
must distinguish governmental activities which are of a proprietary nature, such as those
which have displaced or supplemented traditionally private enterprises, from those func-
tions which are truly governmental in nature. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579,
581, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 897-98 (1968); W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON,
supra note 1, at 1051. "For example, activities of police or firefighters, though tortious, are
usually considered governmental in the sense that they involve the kind of power expected
of government..." Id. at 1053. Other states also use the governmental/proprietary function
distinction. See, e.g., Canade, Inc. v. Town of Blue Grass, 195 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Iowa 1972)
(fire department not liable for leaving scene of fire on plaintiff's property without extin-
guishing blaze); Gardner v. McDowell, 202 Kan. 705, 709, 451 P.2d 501, 505 (1969) (govern-
mental immunity protects police officers who opened fire with revolvers on 70 year old wo-
man); Moffit v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 255, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (governmental immunity
protects police officers who jailed individual who became ill due to exposure).
Conversely, if the municipality operates an electric or water company for which fees are
charged, this activity is considered proprietary. See, e.g., Rannells v. City of Cleveland, 41
Ohio St. 2d 1, 4, 321 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1975) (city water department functions in proprietary
capacity; city liable for escape of chlorine gas); Rice v. Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 235, 69
S.E.2d 543, 549 (1952) (city electric department operates in proprietary capacity).
4 Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1984). In Miller,
the court stated:
Public entities remain immune from negligence claims arising out of the perform-
ance of their governmental functions including police protection, unless the in-
jured person establishes a special relationship with the entity, which would create
a specific duty to protect that individual, and the individual relied on the per-
formance of that duty.
Id. at 510, 467 N.E.2d at 495, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 831 (citations omitted). See also Weiner v.
New York City Transit Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 433 N.E.2d 124, 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141,
144 (1982) (allocation of police resources constitutes governmental function for which there
can be no liability abser." pecial relationship); Riss, 22 N.Y.2d at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 861,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:856
torts committed while functioning in its proprietary capacity.5 This
distinction was confronted recently in Crosland v. New York City
Transit Authoritys in which the New York Court of Appeals held
that a municipally owned carrier was not immune from liability
when its employees failed to summon aid when witnessing an at-
tack upon a passenger. 7
In Crosland, several high school students waiting at the 125th
street subway platform were attacked by a youth gang armed with
deadly weapons; Steven Crosland, Jr., the plaintiff's decedent, died
soon thereafter.8 Although policemen normally patrolled the sta-
tion "around-the-clock," 9 none were present during the attack,
which occurred during a brief period between shifts. 10 Plaintiff al-
leged, however, that not only did trackworkers witness the inci-
dent,11 but two trains also passed through the station during the
attack.12 Further, no one summoned police, although they could
have done so at no personal risk.'3
Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against, inter alia,
the Transit Authority, basing its claim on three different theories:
first, that the Transit Authority breached its special duty to
293 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (municipality not liable for failure to provide adequate police protec-
tion to repeatedly threatened member of the public).
5 See Nola v. New York City Transit Auth., 115 App. Div. 2d 461, 495 N.Y.S.2d 697,
(2d Dep't 1985) (Transit Authority traditionally viewed as fulfilling a private function and
thus performs in proprietary capacity); see also Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 511, 467
N.E.2d 493, 496, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832 (when state operates college dormitory, it has same
duty as private landlords and is deemed to perform in proprietary capacity); Riss, 22 N.Y.2d
at 581, 240 N.E.2d at 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98 (operation and control of rapid transit
system constitutes proprietary governmental activity). "When a city performs tasks that
have traditionally been engaged in by private landlords . . ., it is performing a corporate
function and acting in a proprietary capacity and the imposition of liability on established
principles of tort law would logically follow." Bass, 38 App. Div. 2d at 411, 330 N.Y.S.2d at
573-74.
6 68 N.Y.2d 165, 498 N.E.2d 1143, 506 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1986).
'Id. at 167, 498 N.E.2d at 143, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
8 Id., 498 N.E.2d at 143-44, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671. Steven had attended a show with
several other students at the New York City Music and Art High School between the hours
of 8:00 and 11:00 P.M. on the night of the attack. After the show, several of the students
decided to wait for the express train downtown at the 125th Street IND subway station. A
gang of approximately ten to fifteen boys brutally beat the students. Steven died as a result
of his injuries. Id.
o Id. at 168, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
10 Id.
" Id. at 167, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671. Plaintiff alleged that motormen
saw the attack but chose to ignore it.
12 Id.
Is Id.
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Steven to provide "around-the-clock" police protection in light of
prior assaults that occurred in the station; second, that the defend-
ant's employees violated the Transit Authority's internal mandate
to "take every precaution to prevent ... injuries to persons"; and
third, that the defendant, as a common carrier, breached its duty
to protect passengers.1" The defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied by the Supreme Court at Special Term.15 The
Appellate Division dismissed the first two causes of action,16 but
affirmed on the basis of the third. 7 The question was certified to
the Court of Appeals as to whether the order was properly made. 8
In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Appellate Division's holding that liability could not be based on
the absence of police protection 9 or violation of the Transit Au-
thority's internal rules. 20 In dismissing the cause of action based on
" Crosland, 110 App. Div. 2d 148, at 149, 493 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475-76 (2d Dep't 1985).
Plaintiff's first theory alleged that because the Transit Authority knew of "the inordinately
high rate of serious crimes in the area" and "assigned police-people ... for shifts around-
the-clock," a special duty was owed to plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 149, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
Plaintiff's second theory was predicated on Transit Authority Rules and Regulations Rule
85, which requires that employees "take every precaution to prevent., injuries to persons."
Id. Plaintiff alleged that because the Transit Authority employees either deserted their post
or "ignored . . .permitted and encouraged the . . . attack," the employees breached the
Transit Authority's rule. Plaintiff's third theory claimed that in carrying out activities which
have traditionally been maintained by private enterprises, the Transit Authority failed to
meet the standard of care owed to passengers by privately owned common carriers. Id. at
155-56, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 480-81.
" Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 168, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.d at 671.
1" Crosland, 110 App. Div. 2d at 154-56, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 477-481.
17 Id.
18 Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 168, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
z Id. "[S]ome direct contact between agents of the municipality and the injured party"
is necessary to create a special duty. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 469, 482
N.E.2d 70, 75, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591, 596 (1985). No justifiable reliance was created since Steven
and the police had no direct contact. In Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d
763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1978), it was held that the City of New York was liable for negli-
gently breaching a special duty owed to children who crossed at designated intersections
while traveling to and from school. Id. at 196, 375 N.E.2d at 767, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 587. A
duty was also found to be owed to a person who collaborated with the police in the arrest of
a dangerous fugitive. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80-81, 154 N.E.2d 534,
537, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1958). However, the mere scheduling of policemen is a discre-
tionary function which does not create a special duty. See Weiner v. New York City Transit
Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 433 N.E.2d 124, 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1982).
20 Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 168-69, 498 N.E.2d at 144-45, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72. Rule
85 of the Transit Authority's Rules and Regulations imposes a higher than ordinary stan-
dard of care. However, this internal directive does not impose a higher standard of liability
on the Transit Authority. Id. Any common carrier merely owes "ordinary care commensu-
rate with the existing circumstances." Thomas v. Central Greyhound Lines, 6 App. Div. 2d
649, 652, 180 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (1st Dep't 1958).
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lack of police presence, the court followed Weiner v. Metropolitan
Transit Authority,1 which held that allocation of police resources
is a governmental activity and, in the absence of specific represen-
tations, creates no special duty to protect any specified individ-
ual.22 However, the court held that the third cause of action was
proper; a public carrier acts through its employees in its proprie-
tary capacity and may therefore be liable for their failure to sum-
mon aid when witnessing the attack of a passenger.2 3
Although the court correctly held that the Transit Authority's
employees have an affirmative duty to summon help, at least when
they can do so at no risk to themselves, it is suggested that the
court did not adequately discuss two crucial points. First, the court
failed to explore the distinction between the governmental and
proprietary capacities of municipal corporations.24 For example,
the maintenance of adequate police or fire protection by the state
constitutes a discretionary function which is afforded the protec-
tion of governmental immunity.25 Conversely, when the state per-
21 55 N.Y.2d 175. 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982).
2 Id. at 178, 433 N.E.2d at 125, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
2' Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169-70, 498 N.E.2d at 144-45, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 672; see Wei-
ner, 55 N.Y.2d at 175, 433 N.E.2d at 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 141. The court interpreted Wei-
ner to mean that because the distribution of police resources is a function of governmental
capacity, a municipally owned common carrier may not be held liable for injuries to passen-
gers resulting from such allocation decisions. Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169, 498 N.E.2d at 145,
506 N.Y.S.2d at 672. In determining whether a publicly owned common carrier should be
liable, the court must look to "the specific act or omission out of which the injury is claimed
to have arisen and the capacity in which that act or failure to act occurred ... [and] not
whether the agency involved is engaged generally in proprietary activity." Id. (quoting Wei-
ner, 55 N.Y.2d at 182, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 144).
24 See Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169, 498 N.E.2d at 145, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 672. Despite the
fact that the Court of Appeals only briefly touched upon this point, the Appellate Division
discussed this crucial distinction in great detail. See Crosland, 110 App. Div. 2d at 154-56,
493 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80. The court stated "that in the absence of a 'special relationship,' and
reliance thereon, 'public entities remain immune from negligence claims arising out of the
performance of their governmental functions, including police protection.'" Id. at 154-55,
493 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (quoting Weiner, 55 N.Y.2d at 175, 433 N.E.2d at 141, 448 N.Y.S.2d at
124). "Public entities, however, are not immune from negligence claims stemming from the
performance of their proprietary functions." Crosland, 110 App. Div. 2d at 155, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 479-80. See also Rubino v. City of New York, 114 App. Div. 2d 243, 246, 498
N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1st Dep't 1986) (distinction between governmental and proprietary ca-
pacity frequently determined by judicial interpretation). The distinction was also recognized
in Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 411, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573-74 (2d Dep't
1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 894, 300 N.E.2d 154, 346 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1973), where the court held
that the maintenance of a police force by the Housing Authority constituted governmental
operation for which liability may not be imposed absent a special relationship. Id. at 414,
330 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
25 See Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 510, 467 N.E.2d 493, 495, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831.
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forms a service traditionally provided by private landlords, it acts
in its proprietary capacity.26 Under these circumstances, it has
been held that the state may be liable for negligence in carrying
out such proprietary functions .27 New York has long recognized the
rule that a privately owned common carrier may be liable for the
negligent acts of its employees. 28 Therefore, it is submitted that
the state should face the same proprietary liability for the negli-
gent acts of its employees in the operation, management and con-
trol of a publicly owned common carrier.
In Crosland, the allegations centered upon the failure of the
Transit Authority employees to summon police assistance upon
witnessing the attack of a passenger.2 9 Since the alleged negligence
involved the conduct of the municipality's employees and did not
result from executive decisions or allocation of resources,30 it does
not fall within the boundary of governmental immunity.3 1 Instead,
the specific inaction alleged to have proximately caused the injury
falls within the proprietary capacity for which liability may be im-
Allocation of police resources is a governmental function for which there can be no liability
absent a special relationship. See, e.g., Weiner, 55 N.Y.2d at 181, 433 N.E.2d at 127, 448
N.Y.S.2d at 144 (1982) (city not liable for failure to provide adequate police protection ab-
sent a special relationship).
2' See Rubino, 114 App. Div. 2d at 249, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 835. In an action by the plain-
tiff-teacher to recover for injuries sustained while supervising a class in a school yard, the
court held that "the wrongdoing charge here in no way involves the allocation or deploy-
ment of police resources or activities but on the contrary, stems from a failure to fulfill
proprietary duties traditionally imposed on landlords or landowners to maintain their prop-
erty in a reasonably safe condition ... ." Id. When the state operates university housing
facilities, it owes the same duties to its tenants as private landlords in the maintenance of
physical security devices in the building. See Miller, 62 N.Y.2d at 508. 467 N.E.2d at 494,
478 N.Y.S.2d at 830. See also Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 274, 107
N.E.2d 441, 443 (1952) (municipality owes "duty of reasonable and ordinary care" to citi-
zens who enter public park).
27 See Miller, 62 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 467 N.E.2d at 494, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 830 (plaintiff-
rape victim may recover damages against state for failure to keep dormitory locked).
28 See Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 353, 70 N.E. 857, 859 (1904)
(citing BOOTH ON RAILWAYS § 372) (privately owned common carrier must "safely carry its
passengers and ... compensate them for all unlawful and tortious injuries inflicted by its
servants").
2' Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 167, 498 N.E.2d at 144, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
10 Crosland, 110 App. Div 2d at 155-56, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 480. See Enghauser Mfg. Co. v.
Eriksson Eng'g Ltd., 6 Ohio St. 3d 31, 35, 451 N.E.2d 228, 232 (1983). The "appropriate
dividing line falls between those functions which rest on the exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion and represent planning and policy-making and those functions which involve the
implementation and execution of such governmental policy or planning." Id.
21 See Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169-70, 498 N.E.2d at 145, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
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posed.3 2 Imposing such liability for the inaction of employees will
not put the courts in the position of intruding upon legislative or
executive functions.3
Second, the Crosland court did not discuss the defendant's
duty to its passengers by virtue of its status as a common carrier24
New York maintains the rule that a common carrier must reasona-
bly provide for the safety of its passengers.3 5 This includes sum-
moning help during the attack of passengers.36 A municipally
owned common carrier must, like a privately owned carrier, take
reasonable precautions for the safety of its passengers.37 The de-
fendant's employees in Crosland were thus under an affirmative
duty to summon aid when they received notice that a passenger
was being attacked.3 8 Consequently, if it is found that the Transit
Authority failed in its proprietary duty as a common carrier to
summon aid, it will be liable for injuries proximately caused by
this failure. 9
The New York Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
32 Crosland, 110 App. Div. at 155-56, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
11 See Weiner v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 182, 433 N.E.2d 124, 127,
448 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1982).
" Crosland, 110 App. Div. 2d at 155-57, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 478-80.
35 Eisman v. Port Auth. Transp. Hudson Corp., 96 Misc. 2d 678, 409 N.Y.S.2d 578
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). If non-governmental carriers have a duty to reasonably pro-
vide for the safety of its passengers, "[s]uch a duty would appear to be equally applicable to
a government maintained railroad." Id. at 681, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 580-81. In Amoruso v. New
York City Transit Auth., 12 App. Div. 2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1st Dep't 1960), the court
noted:
There is no question but that the defendant, a railroad carrier, is under a duty to
take reasonable precautions for the protection and the safety of its passengers.
The nature and extent of such duty is dependent upon the circumstances of each
particular situation and danger reasonably to be anticipated.
Id. at 12, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 856; see also Green Bus Lines v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp.,
287 N.Y. 309, 312, 39 N.E.2d 251, 251-53 (1969) (upon notice of attack by fellow passenger,
privately owned common carrier owes duty to protect passenger). Other states follow the
same rule. See Kenny v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.
1978) (common carrier owes duty to protect fare paying passengers from reasonably ex-
pected criminal activity), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
"' See Green Bus Lines, 287 N.Y. at 312, 39 N.E.2d at 251-53.
" See Prinz v. City of New York, 98 Misc. 2d 952, 953-54, 415 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979). Although the Prinz court held that a public carrier's duties are
coextensive with those of private carriers, id., both Weiner and Crosland establish that a
public carrier will not be liable for lack of police security, while a private carrier might. See
Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 169, 498 N.E.2d at 144-45, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 671-72; Weiner, 55
N.Y.2d at 179, 433 N.E.2d at 125, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
" Cf. Green Bus Lines, 287 N.Y. at 309, 39 N.E.2d at 252-53 (duty imposed on private
carrier to protect passenger upon due notice of attack).
31 See Crosland, 68 N.Y.2d at 170, 498 N.E.2d at 146, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
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plaintiff made out a case sufficient to withstand a motion for sum-
mary judgment. The effect of this holding will likely encourage the
Transit Authority to take greater responsibility in supervising its
employees. If municipally owned common carriers are subject to
the same liability as private carriers, perhaps the subways will be-
come a much safer place for passengers.
Brenda F. Szydlo
